The German high command for their eastern front was OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres, the Army High Command), headed by Hitler himself. As the spring of 1944 ended, OKH anticipated a Soviet offensive somewhere on the eastern front. The question was, where would it hit? The Germans believed it would most likely come out of the Ukraine and into the Balkans. There were several reasons to believe that. One was a Balkan offensive would most quickly extend the successes of the Red Army’s previous winter offensive in the Ukraine. A drive into the Balkans could take Romania and Hungary out of the war, which would deduct those nations’ armies from the overall Axis order of battle while also taking the oilfields at Ploesti and Lake Balaton out of their industrial system. Were the Red Army to seize those fields, the German war economy would collapse and its combat forces would be largely immobilized for want of fuel and lubricants.

Finally, there was the fact Soviet Maskirovka worked: it convinced OKH the coming offensive would be in the south. German reserves were accordingly shifted there, especially the vital mechanized units. Among other such formations, LVI Panzer Corps was pulled out of AGC and sent to Army Group North Ukraine. Out of some 4,800 tanks and assault guns on the front, the Germans left only 550 in AGC. Another critical shortage was in the air: AGC had but 40 operational fighters to defend the skies above it.

Green US Forces at Kasserine, 1943. The fierce German counterattack against rookie US forces in North Africa that led to Patton’s promotion to army command.

Savo Island. A revisionist interpretation of this near-miss Japanese naval victory off the coast of Guadalcanal late in 1942.